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Abstract
During the First World War, the first efforts to memorialize the conflict were heavily
influenced by the propaganda characteristic of the era. The style of modernism found new
precedence during the conflict due to its unfiltered portrayal of war. Official British war artists
were commissioned by the British War Memorial Committee (BWMC) starting in 1918, and
many such as C.R.W. Nevinson and Wyndham Lewis contributed modernist works. These
actions are indicative of those that drove the British government to become a propaganda
machine. Firstly, the BWMC manipulated the growing popularity of modern artists and adapted
their work to fit the government’s narrative. Secondly, the subjectivity of the modern works, an
element that contributed to their popularity, was distorted as the BWMC saw fit. Lastly, the
BWMC was founded by leaders who saw themselves as harbingers of culture, with little concern
as to the everyday hardship the conflict brought. After the collapse of the BWMC, these works
were acquired by the Imperial War Museum (IWM). The IWM tended to either place these
works in their archive or display them in a very traditional manner, at odds with the themes and
subject matter of the works. Thus, I argue, these paintings have been remembered for their




During the First World War, the commission of official war art and plans for its exhibition
by the British War Memorials Committee (BWMC) as well as traditional forms of display within
the Imperial War Museum (IWM) were heavily influenced by war propaganda rather than their
supposed efforts. Modernist artists and their work became more accessible for public
consumption as the First World War raged, and government and museum officials both raced to
procure depictions of the conflict. These artists transformed from outcasts on the edge of the art
world to purveyors of true images of the conflict. The ways in which the BWMC and IWM
procured these artworks and their plans for display were heavily influenced by the British
propagandistic practices that were occurring simultaneously. As the war went on, mediums such
as photography and film became popular ways of disseminating propaganda. In contrast, the
perceived permanence of the paintings produced by modernist artists as a part of the BWMC
scheme conveyed a sense of memorialization which both organizations attempted to lean into.
This was an attempt to keep focus on the war effort, even as the First World War came to an end
and many wished to leave the conflict behind them.
Once subversive and shocking to the ‘British Establishment’, modern art groups were
kept on the outskirts of British art society pre-WWI. This establishment, which consisted
primarily of national museums along with conservative press, acted as the gatekeepers of the art
establishment in London. Rather than falling into obscurity at the start of the war, as their critics
hoped, modernist artists took an interest in the conflict and began to provide their own
representations of the conflict. These portrayals radically differed in appearance, when compared
to traditional depictions of war. Modern war painting was characterized by “intense
concentration on the materiality of paint and surface...and an emphasis on freshness...vigour and
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energy” (Malvern 45). Academic war painting lacked the urgency suggested by modern
paintings, and treated the viewer as an outside observer, rather than immersing them in the
subject matter (Malvern 48). Modern painting was considered a step away from academic
painting, regardless of subject matter. ‘Peace pictures’ were a popularly circulated form of
academic art during the WWI era. They provided an escape from the conflict for those on the
home front and reminded soldiers on the front lines of the homes they wanted to return to. These
pictures were traditional in subject matter, as the majority of them depicted landscapes and
included the presence of women. These images were rooted in Victorian tradition and harkened
back to a time before the war. Although these forms of painting were drastically different, both
would serve similar purposes by the end of the war. While academic painting rewarded the
viewer with an idyllic, idealistic view of England, both academic and modern artists served to
remind the viewer of a constant patriotic duty, whether or not their view of it was favorable.
During WWI, paintings frequently competed with the mediums of photography and film
in providing unique representations of the conflict. Photography was used previously in conflicts
including the Crimean War, the American Civil War and the Spanish-American War, and
discussed within scholarly communities as an artistic medium for several decades. However, it
was still popularly seen as an objective and scientific medium. When it came to depicting
real-life events, people flocked to exhibitions containing photographs of the front, but gradually
grew to distrust their authenticity. Photography, much like film, was often staged, with soldiers
serving as actors. These materials were then evaluated for content and censored accordingly, to
prevent the ‘enemy’ from procuring accurate information about the military and their practices
(Sanders 124). The censorship rampant within these mediums was felt with war paintings as
well, but to a lesser extreme. The inherent falseness of these images only served to solidify
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paintings’ status as a fine art. These mediums also supplied the dichotomy between photography
as a ‘witnessing’ medium and painting as an ‘experiencing’ medium, with painting providing the
de facto depiction of WWI.
Propaganda took many forms throughout the WWI era, with practices utilized from
1914-16 focusing primarily on propaganda abroad. This strategy was prefaced with the idea that
“it is better to influence those who can influence others than attempt a direct appeal to the mass
of the population”. Thus, the Foreign Office in London specifically targeted professionals such
as journalists, teachers, etc. when sending their materials to neutral and enemy countries
(Sanders 101). The significance of these early propaganda techniques was that they were a
deliberate turn away from internal morale. The people of Great Britain widely supported the war
effort, answering the call for unity and volunteering themselves to help the cause (Haste 22).
These practices were also an extension of British personal diplomacy, which reflected on a
“policy-making elite'' who were not knowledgeable about the power of mass public opinion
(Sanders 101). Rather, the posters and pamphlets resulting from this outreach were to be of the
highest literary quality and the British case argued delicately. These elitist sensibilities were later
to be found in the handling of the official war art scheme.
In the years 1917-18, Britain turned its attention to more internal matters. As the Allied
nations faced increased losses and morale at the home front suffered, the government set out to
‘remobilize’ its citizens. Focus shifted from influencing the opinion of intermediaries to directly
influencing public opinion. There was no coordinated official propaganda focused towards the
home front until 1917. The National War Aims Committee (NWAC) filled this gap. The NWAC
had two main purposes: to counteract any pacifist propaganda and to instill a sense of
determination to maintain the ideals of Liberty and Justice which were the cause of the Allies
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(Haste 41). Propaganda became more simplified, achieving the NWAC’s goal by fabricating
images and information, then widely proliferating it to provide justification for the conflict
(Haste 3). The official war paintings served a similar purpose by rejecting a pacifist message
through display of war. These paintings were reminders of the sacrifices of many throughout the
conflict, not to establish WWI as a brutal, modernized conflict, but to establish the necessary
hardships to defend the motherland. This led to further emphasis on the ideals of Liberty and
Justice, especially when the BWMC paintings were collected and displayed by the IWM after the
conflict.
As a part of the Department of Information (DoI), later the Ministry of Information
(MoI), the BWMC formed in March 1918, following the transformation of the British
Department of Information into the Ministry of Information. Lord Beaverbrook became the chair
of the latter, who sought to change the focus of government-sponsored war art used as
propaganda only during the conflict to a collection of artworks with longer lasting national value.
The committee had a further ambitious goal of creating a Hall of Remembrance in which to
memorialize the artworks they commissioned throughout the conflict. The proposed design for
the Hall planned to incorporate the Classical and Renaissance tropes with the modern artwork to
be displayed. Through these choices, the Committee saw themselves as equals to Renaissance
patrons, due to their “humanist ideals, their noble civic purpose, and the very size of the scheme”
(Walton 396). The BWMC goals thus followed the propagandistic ideals of Justice and Liberty
put forth in earlier British propaganda.
Originally the National War Museum, the IWM was founded by Alfred Mond, Martin
Conway, and Charles Ffoulkes in March 1917. All three men were well-connected, and lead in a
Victorian, scholarly manner commonly found in museums during the late 19th century
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(Wellington 48). The IWM was established to procure objects of many kinds pertaining to WWI.
They were fierce competitors of the BWMC, who wished to acquire the war artwork
commissioned by the committee for themselves. When these artworks were acquired by the
IWM, they were housed and displayed similarly to other artifacts, including objects such as
weaponry and personal memorabilia. The IWM exhibition displays were shallow in physical
depth, providing a map-like understanding of these objects and the purpose they served during
the war (Pearce 139). This focused display method solidified the museum’s view as objective,
thus perpetuating ideas similar to those included in propaganda. The museum aimed to be a place
of reverence and reflection, and yet its focus on objects used to create and portray violence
suggests a celebration of the events these objects depict (Malvern 178). Due to its nature as a
museum that seeks to enlighten, the IWM cannot be said to responsibly memorialize a bitter
conflict. Rather, the IWM used its war-related objects, such as its art collection, as propaganda to
celebrate Britain's military might, and continues to do so to this day.
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Popular Mediums of Expression During WWI
The modes of expression that were most commonly used during WWI can be broken
down into two categories: painting, which can be broken down further into academic and modern
modes, and photography, including the rise of film. Each medium had its own distinctive styles
as well as arguments for and against their use in depicting the conflict. The main concern of the
general public was which medium could portray the conflict with the most inherent ‘truth’. To
this day, there is no one correct answer to this inquiry. It is difficult to discern the truth of any
event not witnessed first-hand, especially when said event is depicted by an artist, whose
viewpoint is always subjective. What is certain, however, is that popular opinion about each
medium did shift as the conflict went on, in the public’s search for the most accurate depictions
of conflict.
Academic painting was an artistic style put forth by established groups such as the Royal
Academy of London. These paintings had a classical composition style, which Malvern describes
as the antithesis of modern painting: the absence of “subjectivity, corporeality, and social
existence” (44). This style can be seen in academic war paintings of the era, most notably James
Beadle’s Zero-Hour (fig. 1). As a member of the Royal Academy, Beadle’s work can properly
exemplify this artistic style. The painting depicts a group of British soldiers waiting in a trench to
go ‘over the top’ and march forward into battle (Malvern 44). An event such as this would have
been extremely loud, disorienting, and chaotic. None of these elements seem present in this
painting. Instead, the painting may be compared to The Death of General Wolfe (fig. 2), in which
a violent, chaotic event has been both pacified and largely falsified. Both images serve the
purpose of depicting a certain event during conflict without emotion. In the latter piece, death is
seen as a heroic, chivalric act, while in the former, the soldiers depicted are not shell-shocked nor
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weary of the battle they are to take place in, but instead, stoically accepting their duty to their
country.
Using Malvern’s three aforementioned criteria, we can properly analyze Zero-Hour as a
component of academic war painting. Firstly, there is absolute objectivity incorporated into the
piece, with the inclusion of a foreground, middle ground, and background. The foreground of
mud and rubble places the viewer at a remove from the painting. There is no single person with
whom the viewer can identify or empathize, the soldiers are there simply to be gazed upon.
Secondly, none of the soldiers show any corporeality. Although the sergeant is checking his
watch and another soldier peers over the divide, there is no interiority implied in their actions.
Attention is strictly given to their forms, to such an extent that any emotion is completely absent.
The soldiers figure as symbols of the conflict more than individual human beings.
Lastly, there is no social component of the painting, in which prevalent social issues may
be discussed. The men shown are on the brink of risking their lives, and yet the painting provides
no cues for this topic to be discussed. They seem perpetually stuck in this moment in time, with
no indication of events prior to or following this moment. Thus, the viewer is both unexposed to
any violence and reassured in the reputation of those fighting in the name of their country. They
can feel secure in their viewing of the conflict and no moral dilemmas arise from the
contemplation of what these men are about to undertake.
Following similar criteria, the so-called ‘peace pictures’ painted during WWI were created
as a respite from daily life during wartime and an idealistic representation of what soldiers were
striving to protect (Lady’s Pictorial). The most popular genre of these pictures were landscapes
of the English countryside, such as that depicted in Peace and The Tranter’s Cart: An Autumn
Evening in Berkshire (fig. 3 and 4). These images were very similar in what they depicted,
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namely, rural landscapes in which examples of leisure activities or labor are undertaken at a slow,
deliberate pace. These similarities were deliberate, as the uniform idea of an idyllic England
would make fighting in an unprecedented war seem worth fighting for, even to the most common
man. This collectivity helped citizens to band together, regardless of background or status, as
they could easily visualize what their country was fighting to protect. These pieces acted as a
“landscape of retreat” for those living in Britain, and for some, functioned as a regular part of
their daily lives, where they would seek respite from the trials of each day.
Similar to those at the home front, these images also provided soldiers with respite from
the day-to-day experience of fighting in the conflict. Indeed, pictures such as these gave soldiers
an idealized vision of what was at stake in the conflict. Peace pictures were considered as
“categorically feminine” as opposed to the coded-masculine war paintings proliferating
simultaneously. These pictures effectively ‘feminize’ the landscape by depicting it as unfailingly
beautiful and needing protection from the British soldiers fighting on the front lines (Malvern
48). Thus, these paintings solidified the dichotomy of the ‘feminine’ home front and ‘masculine’
front lines. These ideas ignore the presence of women on the front lines serving their country as
nurses, drivers, and more, as well as the men who stayed home due to a number of physical and
familial reasons. This dichotomy also replicates the binary of colonial discourse in which
colonial territory is feminized as land needing to be controlled while the frontier is a masculine
space in which resources are theirs for the taking. Using traditional ideas about gender, conflict,
and the Empire, academic painting provided depictions of Britain which public opinion could
rally behind on their way to victory.
. Modernist painting, by contrast, came into prominence during the course of the war.
Indeed, many members of the European avant-garde movement saw the conflict as an
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opportunity for a renewal of their cultures and participating in it as “purgative” and “beneficial”
for the individual. The conflict served to create new opportunities for these subversive artists by
giving them new, unprecedented subject matter and a chance to further their careers (Malvern 6).
Modernism’s break from tradition would make it the perfect choice in which to depict WWI, as
both the movement and the conflict would provide sights previously unseen by the majority of
the nation. The sense of ‘otherness’ that proliferated during the conflict, due to increased
mechanized warfare and widespread mobilization was, according to some, best seen through the
canvases produced by modern artists.
As such, these artists could potentially fulfill their established duty to their country by
depicting the conflict through their unique artistry. Artists C.R.W. Nevinson and Wyndham
Lewis, both later contributors of the BWMC, compounded their patriotic efforts by joining the
fight themselves. While Lewis served in the infantry, Nevinson was a volunteer ambulance
driver for the Red Cross in France and Belgium, and later transferred to the Royal Army Medical
Corps (RAMC) and the 3rd London General Hospital in 1915 (Malvern 141). After being
discharged the same year, Nevinson took part in each subsequent London exhibition during the
conflict and became an official war artist from 1917 onwards (Malvern 141). Along with
conveying a previously unknown sense of ‘otherness’, the concept of the ‘soldier-artist’ was
another key part of modernism. Also true for artists of differing artistic styles, the work of the
‘soldier-artist’ was established as the most credible of all depictions of the front. Due to their
status as enlisted men at the front, these individuals had the distinctive power to depict events as
they happened, and could do so within reason (Wellington 143). The authority associated with
modernists would expand as more artists of this style were hired on as official war artists
throughout the conflict.
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Using Malvern’s three criteria of “subjectivity, corporeality, and social existence” once
more, we also can see how modern war painting significantly differs from that of academic war
painting (44). Looking at Wyndham Lewis’s A Battery Shelled (fig. 5), these traits feature
prominently. The painting lacks a foreground, leaving the viewer without a vantage point in
which to view the subject matter objectively. With only the chaos of the middle ground and
background, the viewer is left to decide the meaning of the piece for themselves (Malvern 106).
The piece also has a warped sense of corporeality, as the three officers on the left side have
green-tinted skin and seem at a remove from the battle raging just behind them. The soldiers
themselves take on barely human form, resembling disparate parts taken together to assemble a
machine. It becomes hard to differentiate the soldiers from the buildings and equipment that
flank them on either side of the canvas. Lastly, this piece has an overwhelming sense of social
existence. Compared to Beadle’s Zero-Hour, this painting created as part of the BWMC war art
scheme addresses social conflict head-on. The officers to the left convey indifference and a lack
of emotion, even as one looks over to observe the action, contrasting the academic depictions of
officers as stern but fatherly figures to their men. The typical heroic depictions of soldiers as fit,
healthy men have also been replaced by abstract notions of soldiers without seeming
consciousness or identity.
By comparing the aesthetic elements of these two paintings, the wide disparity between
both styles becomes clear. Academic war paintings allow the viewer to gain an understanding of
the scene before them, and thus feel in control of their viewing experience. This viewing could
help to reinforce the idea of a nation going forward to defend itself from its enemies, due to both
the subject matter and the control the viewer feels they have. From the observer’s point of view,
this is their fight, these are the soldiers fighting for them, and thus they ideally would feel pride
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in such images and determination to help their country remain strong during the conflict. There is
little emotion within the piece, as this aspect is meant to be taken up by the viewer. The idea of a
patriotic fight for freedom thus became associated with Britain, while death and destruction was
viewed as a hallmark of German forces (Wellington 30). Much like Zero-Hour does, John Singer
Sargent’s Gassed (fig. 6), created for the BWMC, is a prime example of affirming the traditional
values of upstanding citizenship. Whether before or after the brutality of conflict, soldiers are
always depicted with their dignity and stoicism in tact. Embodying Britain’s patriotic ideals,
these paintings help the viewer to assume that what they depict is the natural order of things
(Malvern 105). Gassed in particular conveys hope in the form of soldiers being led away to a
medical tent and other soldiers in the far background playing a soccer game. These soldiers will
soon heal and take pride in the sacrifice they have given to their country.
By contrast, modern depictions of war are confrontational and challenge the viewer's
notion of what they may have seen or heard about the conflict. Especially if the viewer had been
kept in the dark about the conditions in which the war was being fought, these paintings may
have come as a shock when they were displayed. Despite the controversial nature of these pieces,
many argued that these paintings served as stark realism, which was viewed as a more ‘truthful’
approximation of the conflict (Wellington 142). Without the presence of such images, the public
would effectively be left with the works of academic painters, which presented a more
overarching theme of empire. Modern works, by contrast, prized an individual view of conflict,
thus supplying that more ‘truthful’ version of events. To be disturbed by these depictions was the
point of their creation, as they broke through the carefully created version of events perpetuated
by the British government and private institutions that sympathized with them (Wellington 143).
These paintings brought a certain power to the viewer, allowing them to create their own
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narrative of the conflict built from more realistic depictions of it. By the end of the conflict,
modernism was seen as the dominant style in which to portray the war as a result of these
considerations (Wellington 143). Although modernist painting was seen as a cutting-edge
medium, it still enjoyed the benefits of substantial exhibition and gradual acceptance into storied
institutions during the conflict.
Photography, by sharp contrast, was not nearly as accepted into the artistic canon as the
medium of painting. However, the photographic medium shared the same opportunities to take
advantage of depicting a then unrivaled worldwide conflict. As mentioned previously,
photography at this point in history was known primarily for its role in journalistic and scientific
research. It had not yet been recognized as the artistic medium it is today (Wellington 140).
Photography had the opportunity to portray the conflict with the most transparency, due to the
camera’s ability to capture precisely what it sees. On the whole, it took less time to capture an
image than to make a sketch of the same event. This faster response time would imply that
photography could capture evidence of the conflict and be sent back to the home front for
inspection at record time. The increased rate of production helped to solidify photography as a
medium which portrayed events that were happening immediately (Wellington 141). This status
did not help photography to become further recognized for its artistic properties, as it was seen to
be dissimilar to the longer, laborious effort of painting.
Throughout the conflict, photography became controversial as more and more viewers
gained knowledge of staged images that portrayed events, rather than capturing them in real
time. However, photographers such as Frank Hurley would make the case that these doctored
images were precisely what was needed to accurately portray the front lines. Hurley took part in
creating doctored prints which were prints made up of a composite of picture images to form a
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collage-like whole. Hurley referred to his creations as ‘Photographic Impression Pictures’, and
stood by his work even as his appointment as an official Australian war photographer hung in the
balance (Wishart). Hurley reported that frequent attempts to properly portray the horrors of war
through single negatives had failed. By combining his negatives together, Hurley was able to
portray his subjective truth of the conflict. The official AIF (Australian Imperial Forces)
historian Captain Charles Bean, who was appointed to the same Australian War Records Section
as Hurley, strongly objected to Hurley’s work and refused to accept it as such. When Hurley
threatened to leave his position over the argument, it was agreed that six composite images
would be printed if Hurley remained (Wishart). Hurley’s composites thus convey how
photography could be an artistic tool in portraying modern warfare, and as such, truth was not an
important criteria in creating them.
By taking artistic liberty with photographic images, artists such as Hurley believed they
were providing a more human look into the conflict. Single images, while potentially containing
a more ‘objective truth’, would still be at the mercy of censors as well as a combatants’ home
government (Wishart). Composites emphasize that same concept of individuality that separates
modern war painting from academic war painting. A single image can be appropriated by the
nation from which the photographer comes from. Whether by changing the narrative focus of the
image or censoring it, the responsibility of attributing meaning falls to governmental superiors.
By contrast, composite images take artistic liberties, and thus have already had outside meaning
attributed to them. Images such as Hell Fire Corner (fig. 7) by Hurley have meanings passed on
by the photographer, and not only those given by the government, for which the images were
produced, and future viewers. The smoke in the photograph was not included in the original, but
instead added through superimposing two negatives onto the original image (Wishart). While a
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reconstruction, Hurley was able to convey the element of fear more readily through this
composite image and make it distinctly his. Without the added smoke, others could have
attributed less violence to the same photograph. Although photography had been deemed an
artistic medium since the 1880s, these images were seen as ‘fakes’ and denounced by a majority
of soldiers and citizens alike, who were not accustomed to staged images . However, these WWI
composites functioned similarly to modern paintings by allowing the artist their own
interpretations of the conflict.
Film, like photography, was a more experimental medium during WWI. Both fictional
and non-fictional war films proliferated during and after the conflict, and proved to be popular
with the ‘common man’. Film served to make up for the perceived shortcomings of photography
in providing citizens, British and non-British, with reliable depictions of the British front line. At
the time, film was as heavily censored as any other medium; however, the novelty of moving
pictures and the presence of narrative served to instill interest in the general population. The
official war film Battle of the Somme was released in August 1916 by Wellington House, the
British government’s propaganda wing (Haste 45). It proved to be immensely regarded, with
2,000 bookings of the film requested within the first two months of its release. It raised 30,000
pounds for various military charities which is equal to about 2,600,000 pounds in 2020 (Haste
45).
Response to the film prompted increased production of films, both official and unofficial.
By 1917, regular bi-weekly newsreels were being shown in British cinemas (Haste 46). Soon
after, the Ministry of Information, which took control of British war propaganda from then on,
officially adopted film into their repertoire. As a result, the War Office Cinematograph
Committee was formed under the Ministry of Information. They created their own film studios,
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stocked with professional film-makers to produce short films to serve as propaganda (Haste 46).
Films which were short features or reconstructions of events were preferred by the committee, as
they were less likely to contain information which would be useful to the enemy (Sanders 124).
Whether or not particular footage was fabricated, the widespread popularity of the medium
shows that film was able to reach a wide swath of audiences, both physically and mentally. Like
photography, viewers did not necessarily need to visit a museum or other storied institution to
reap the benefits of these mediums. Viewers simply needed to find a local theater and pay a fee
to watch these film reels, and the ease of watching these events unfold underlined the medium’s
accessibility. Indeed, many people’s views of the conflict were shaped by what they saw
unfolding in front of them on the screen.
Painting, photography, and film were three principal mediums through which experience
of the WWI conflict was conveyed. This is not to say that they were the only mediums of
importance through the war. Newspapers, illustrated posters, and sculpture are just some of the
other mediums in which the conflict was described and depicted. However, my research is
focused on the mediums of painting, photography, and film, and thus form the center of my
thesis. Academic painting sought to depict the war as a conflict fought collaboratively by a
mighty empire, while modern painting valued the individual’s perspective of a highly
mechanized, violent conflict. Despite the differences between academic and modern painting,
both benefited from the conflict, as WWI provided subject matter which would boost the careers
of these artisans. Each style also conveys a sense of sacrifice, whether this was depicted as heroic
or harmful. There is a sense of treading new territory by depicting the conflict and through their
portrayals, they come to terms with what they saw, whether in-person or second-hand.
Photography and film were just starting out as artistic mediums within the public sphere,
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and appealed most to the common viewer at the home front. Photography in particular was
accessible to the broader public, due to the ease of printing, and thus was mass produced
especially during the conflict. Both photography and film were also noted by the public to have a
more mechanized nature, as opposed to mediums such as painting and sculpture at that time.
Despite the high reach of photography and film, painting still held a more privileged status in
society. Thus, many civilians, particularly those of higher classes, had greater respect for the
stories told in painting rather than those that mass-produced images told. Painting’s high status
would lead to its later inclusion in the BWMC’s 1918 memorialization plans.
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Propaganda and Memorialization During WWI
The status of propaganda during WWI can generally be split into two parts: propaganda
efforts from 1914-16 and 1917-18. At the beginning of the war, those at the home front were not
opposed to the war; in fact, they overwhelmingly supported Britain’s role in the conflict. Thus,
there was little need for the government to sustain the war effort themselves, and they instead
focused their propagandistic efforts on neutral and enemy countries. Throughout the first half of
the conflict, the public produced a majority of WWI propaganda in Britain. Much of this material
came from the press, through daily newspapers as well as magazines and commercial shops,
which sold wares that aligned with the patriotic fervor of the time. Public propaganda
additionally came in the form of exhibitions at art galleries and museums. These institutions
staged multiple shows where war-related art and artifacts were displayed and visitors could enter
for a fee. By 1917, morale had reached a new low, with the allied nations suffering terrible
defeats and resources running low. By this point, the British government saw fit to construct a
propaganda campaign specifically for the home front, leading to the rise of organizations such as
the National War Aims Committee (NWAC).
As the war neared its end in 1918, the government’s focus shifted once again from home
front propaganda to WWI memorialization. Although the conflict was not officially over,
officials were concerned about how the war would be perceived after it concluded, and sought to
have control over these perceptions. Although localized memorials provided a more personal
approach to memorialization, national memorials such as the Cenotaph (fig. 8) received far more
recognition. At this point, subjective war paintings were also displayed together by the state to
justify their objective ‘truth’ of the war. These paintings were thus given meaning beyond mere
documentation of the war effort, and took on representation of an unprecedented conflict.
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For the first two years of the war, public opinion of the conflict was largely self sustained.
The press was one way citizens showed their support for the war effort, despite increased efforts
to censor information regarding Britain’s military undertakings. In particular, the 1914 Defence
of  the Realm Act (DORA) made it an offense to publish information that may directly or
indirectly be useful to enemy nations (Sanders 7). Despite this rift between the press and the
government, newspapers and magazines continued to proliferate throughout the conflict.
Newspapers such as The Times provided daily updates on the conflict as well as insights from
around the home front. Magazines were more visual in nature, often publishing illustrations
depicting the front lines (Sanders 132). These publications included The Graphic, the Illustrated
War News, and the Sphere. The printed press was one of the most widely accessible forms of
propaganda during WWI, since they were portable and easily available to all, regardless of social
class.
Pictorial magazines in particular were considered a great commercial success due to their
ability to create meanings for the conflict (Hynes 196). Illustrators had greater artistic freedom
than photographers, whose published work was more heavily censored. Since the illustrations did
not originate from a machine but rather the illustrator themselves, there was no original integrity
to the image for an artist to manipulate, simply an artist’s depiction of events. Therefore, the
artistic depictions found in such magazines were more widely accepted by the general public,
than photographs that could have been edited or doctored in some way. This freedom gave
illustrators the chance to produce powerful propaganda, in which moral and political meanings
were prompted. Such drawings established symbolism by tying the soldiers depicted to the
diligent Allied cause, as well as stereotypes to reinforce the idea of the brave, valiant soldier
fighting for his country. Additionally, the rushed, minimal appearance of many sketches give the
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impression that this drawing could have been produced on the front lines. This status served to
further reinforce the ideas put forth by these illustrations.
The popularity of such illustrations was furthered by their sale from commercial vendors.
One example is the proliferation of an illustration entitled The Great Sacrifice (fig. 9) by James
Clark. It first appeared in the Graphic’s Christmas issue published in November 1914 as a large
color foldout print, and depicted a deceased British soldier lying peacefully next to the crucified
figure of Jesus Christ (Graphic). The image’s purpose was to console others going into the
holiday season who had lost loved ones in the first months of the conflict. This consolation is
evident in the way the soldier’s death is idealized - indeed the only indication of injury is a spot
of blood on the man’s forehead - and even comparing the soldier’s sacrifice for his country to
Christ’s sacrifice for all mankind (Bourke 213). By early 1915, prints of the image were sold by
the Graphic for a variety of prices, ranging from a simple unframed print to a framed oil print.
Commercial shops were able to purchase these prints and profit from selling them to customers
(Graphic). Selling the print had public benefits, such as earning a profit as well as being seen as
contributing to morale, similar to the war exhibitions I will discuss shortly. These prints also had
private benefit, as they were widely available for purchase, thus allowing a large part of the
population to sustain their morale through engagement with such images. Circulation of these
images shows the early popularity of civil propaganda, as well as public willingness to meet the
hardships of war, which included the loss of loved ones.
Seeking to take part in these public benefits, art museums and similar organizations took
part in a series of war-related exhibitions. They acted without direct government involvement,
aiming to tap into public interest about the war, inspire recruitment, and maintain morale
(Wellington 30). These shows produced in the early years of the war were seen as a part of
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‘mobilisation from below’. A popular strategy was to create exhibitions that taught the visitor a
lesson about the conflict, which often concerned the evils of the enemy combatants and the need
to join the efforts to suppress them (Wellington 32). The extent to which the individuals
displaying these shows actively believed in what they advocated for is debatable, as museums
faced the challenge of maintaining a budget throughout the conflict. While it is true that many
museum officials did support the war effort and used their influence to persuade others, these
exhibitions were also created out of monetary necessity (Birmingham Post 3).
Public war art exhibitions at the beginning of the war did indeed seek to vilify enemy
nations, most notably Germany. A prime example of this is the multiple exhibitions of cartoonist
Louis Raemaekers’ illustrations. His drawings were meant to spark outrage at a number of
German atrocities, as shown on the front cover of Part One of the “Land and Water” edition of
his cartoons. This rather sensationalized image depicts German soldiers as anthropomorphized
pigs looking over the body of a dead woman, who is assumed to have been killed by them.
According to Malvern, the woman is meant to be Edith Cavell, a British nurse who was killed by
German soldiers in Belgium after attempting to free prisoners of war (18). The bright colors used
to depict such violence bring a sense of immediacy, conveying the message that not only are
these atrocities being committed, they are completed each day. The drawing almost dares the
viewer not to act on behalf of the nation after viewing such violence. The artist’s opinion of the
enemy soldiers, meanwhile, is blatantly evident, due to their depiction as animals instead of men.
Thus, Raemaekers’ depictions contributed directly to the ‘mobilisation from below’
characteristic of early-war propaganda.
In contrast to Raemaekers’ sensational portrayals, war photography exhibitions played on
viewer’s emotions in a more cerebral way. 1915 photography displays in particular focused on
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the destructive power of the German forces by showing the extent of wartime damage. For
example, photographic exhibitions showing Reims Cathedral before and after its destruction of
the German army served as opportune propaganda. Photos such as Shell bursting on the
cathedral at Reims (fig. 10) kept visitors up-to-date with events occurring on the frontlines,
thereby connecting them to the tragedies occurring there. In contrast to the act of merely reading
about the destruction suffered by the Cathedral, seeing images of the event lends perspective to
the scale of the Cathedral as well as the force required to destroy such a building (Wellington
142). These images also reinforced the idea of physical space as being the domain of a certain
nation, in this case, Reims Cathedral being the domain of the French. Rather than a visceral urge
to defend the nation from civilian-targeted atrocities, destruction of an architectural icon signaled
the dangers of losing their cultural identity.
New to the idea of influencing public opinion and encouraged by the high morale of
British citizens, the government directed much of its propaganda efforts towards other nations
from 1914-16. During this time, overseas propaganda avoided being overt or blatant in
conveying its message. This was not an attempt by the British government to avoid blame, but
rather an extension of the “personal diplomacy” that foreign-policy members were used to
conducting before the war (Sanders 101). The most popular form of propaganda sent overseas
came in the form of posters. These were reprinted in newspapers as well as hung in public spaces
such as libraries and banks. Their production rate remained high until mid-1915, when leaflets
and pamphlets, previously relegated to a secondary position, came into the fold (Sanders 104).
Official pamphlets created by Wellington House followed two main criteria: they would be
“academic in tone and scholarly in content” and their official nature would be disguised (Sanders
107).
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By taking a more factual approach in their writing, with the British cause argued only
subtly, these pamphlets were meant to inform the reader and encourage them to make up their
own mind. These pamphlets had to appear to be written by private individuals and bear no
indication of their origin (Sanders 108). Furthermore, they were distributed through private
channels, such as steamboat companies who offered their services at no cost to the government.
The lengths to which British officials went to disguise the origin of these pamphlets can also be
described as ‘black propaganda’, as most who read it would likely have little idea of its true
origins (Sanders 109). Through these strategies, it becomes clear the British thought their
propaganda was effective since it allowed the reader to think for themselves rather than be
indoctrinated into a way of thought. However, at its core, the secretive circulation of these
pamphlets was indicative of nothing less than deception.
The extent of Britain’s overseas propaganda did not stop there, and eventually involved
foreign journalists and press associations. Although in most instances, they refrained from taking
direct control over foreign newspapers, they remained a notable presence in countries such as
America and China (Sanders 116). Britain’s involvement in foreign press led to these countries
receiving increased information about their contributions during the conflict. This information
was not moderated by individual press outlets but rather given directly to them and subsequently
published ‘as is’ (Sanders 117). Along with news of Britain’s war accomplishments, propaganda
materials discussed various other issues, including how the home front responded to the war. A
war painting entitled The Consoler (fig. 11) by H. Copping was printed in the Sunday edition of
the New York Times on February 6, 1916. In similar fashion to The Great Sacrifice, this painting
depicted a Christ-like figure, although the focus of the image was a living widower as opposed to
a deceased soldier. Such images showed foreign nations the ideologies behind Britain’s actions,
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more than the sheer facts of wartime events. Beyond the popular mediums of posters and
pamphlets, picture postcards, cigarette cards, and maps and diagrams are examples of other
materials proliferated at this time.
The British government reserved the right to deem whether certain foreign press
associations were ‘worthy’ of being collaborators through this process. If a press outlet was not
worthy, they were not encouraged to be a part of the process, and did not receive news and
materials to the same extent. The reasons for these choices included previous history with a
certain country, their willingness to cooperate with the British government, and so on (Sanders
120). Despite the scale of Britain’s efforts to disseminate propaganda in foreign nations, no
effective way of measuring the impact of their actions was created by Wellington House, then the
British government’s propaganda headquarters. Instead, judgments carried out about its
effectiveness remained the domain of individual government officials, through their perceptions
and observations (Sanders 111).
Throughout the war, the actions of a few powerful individuals often influenced whole
nations, and that is no different when we consider the social and political implications of official
British propaganda. Until 1917, there was a single government propaganda agency, the Secret
War Propaganda Bureau (SWPB), since they saw little need to influence opinion on the home
front. The SWPB was established in September 1914, mainly to counteract German propaganda
and gain support of the Allied cause from neutral countries (Haste 37). Through these overseas
dealings, the government was able to perfect its strategies for influencing public opinion. This
would come in handy towards the end of the conflict, when the government turned its attention
to internally focused propaganda.
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By 1917, according to Haste, WWI British propaganda became unique due to its use of
rationalization, modernization, and simplification for the first time in a conflict of this scale.
Rationalization means the ability to discern which information and materials should be
disseminated, at what time, and to who. This element explains the shift in focus from overseas to
homefront propaganda in 1917 (Haste 2). Modernization came from the advancements in
communications and media, which allowed propaganda to be circulated to more of the
population in a fraction of the time. Daily newspapers and film are two mediums which were
affected by the increased production rate afforded by modernization (Haste 2). Lastly,
simplification came about using methods that were adopted from public organizations already
producing localized propaganda. In short, it is when a “fabric of images” concerning the war is
built up over time using repetition, in order to build irrefutable justification for fighting in the
conflict (Haste 3). Most importantly, this strategy entails providing the public justification for
what they think and feel about the conflict, but are unable to prove themselves. Unwilling to
provide the truth about the conflict, the government chose to play on the public’s emotions
instead. These three traits would become evident as Britain entered the last two years of the war.
The years of 1917-18 saw a decrease in morale due to the Allied nations’ repeated losses
within the conflict. Public opinion thus soured on the conflict, with many pushing for
negotiations and eventual peace with enemy nations. At this point, the British government
deemed it necessary to interfere in this turning of opinion, and began a ‘remobilization’ effort to
persuade civilians of the necessity to keep fighting. This effort is shown more prominently in the
formation of the NWAC in 1917. The purpose of this committee was to counteract pacifist
publications and opinion as well as convince the civilian population to continually uphold “those
ideals of Liberty and Justice which are the common and sacred cause of the Allies” (Haste 41).
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Ways in which the committee sought to accomplish this included relationships with constituent
party organizations as well as patriotic civilian committees, by which meetings were held and
literature was proliferated.
These strategies also helped uphold the view that peace was not a current option by
reminding civilians of horrible atrocities committed by enemy nations, most notably the
Germans (Haste 42). As such, official dealings with low morale did not take the intelligence of
their civilians into account. Instead of increasing the amount of information available about the
conflict, the government sought to warp the information that was already being circulated to their
advantage (Haste 34). Thus, knowledge of disastrous events and losses was significantly
tampered, disallowing civilians to think critically about the conflict, even if they wished to.
Although the civilian population was more involved in this war than previous instances, mostly
due to the increased mechanization of warfare, the government saw it fitting to keep them in the
dark concerning the finer points of front line events (Haste 35). As a result, the government was
still deeply involved in the proliferation of materials detailing their ideologies when they began
considering the role of memorialization towards the end of WWI.
In looking at more personal and local contributions, the process of memorialization
started earlier than national efforts to do the same. These contributions had stemmed from the
losses suffered by many civilians, who consequently sought solace by honoring their loved ones,
whether individually or with their communities. Some contributions came in the form of rolls of
honor which were established in streets, workplaces, and private homes. Although these also
listed the names of those currently enlisted or conscripted, the names of the dead were listed
equally. Over time, these honor rolls more closely resembled shrines as names were often
decorated with items such as flowers, candles, personal mementos, etc (Kavanagh 79). This
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humble form of remembrance may well represent the most commonly seen form of
commemoration among the British public. These shrines are not to glorify the sacrifices of the
dead or bring pride to their country, but rather to comfort those dealing with loss. This deeply
personal form of memorialization is in considerable contrast to how the British government
chose to memorialize the conflict as well as those who died as a result.
In May 1916 an editorial titled Artists and the War was posted in The Times. This article
set out to resolve precisely what the national role of art was during wartime. Two crucial
elements were discussed: 1) the nature of WWI as a total war, in which both the front line and
home front were affected in equal measure, as well as 2) Britain having a significant asset in the
number of worthy, active artists living among them. In bringing these two elements together, the
author argued, openings would be created for these artists, and create a “lasting national
heritage” through their artistic depictions of war (Malvern 12). These depictions would ensure a
heritage built on remembering both the awful happenings of war as well as actions “that bring
honor to our race” (Malvern 12). Thus the intermingling ideologies of propaganda and
memorialization come to the forefront.
As for the composition of these paintings, the more horrific events of war to be depicted
would stem from the actions of the German army. If they were not explicitly shown committing
foul acts, their presence would be felt through the depiction of battered landscapes and/or injured
British soldiers. Furthermore, any disadvantage a British soldier would be shown in could be
assumed as the result of German interference and not stem from the soldiers’ own actions (Haste
3). In memorializing the conflict, artistic depictions would not stray far from propagandistic
interpretations, except for the increased status these depictions were afforded as they were
mostly paintings created by official war artists. Even particularly harsh depictions of the conflict,
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such as Nevinson’s The Harvest of Battle (fig. 12) could be seen as conveying a message of
bravery and determination on behalf of British soldiers, rather than the commentary on the
suffering of war that the artist had intended it as.
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Creation of the British War Memorials Committee and the Imperial War Museum
In 1918, the last year of WWI, Britain had already set its sights on the aftermath of the
war. They began to discuss what Britain’s legacy in the First World War should entail. The
importance of creating these narratives and securing the objects to support them during the war
was recognized by two institutions in particular: the British War Memorials Committee (BWMC)
and the Imperial War Museum (IWM). By starting a collection while the war was still raging,
these institutions could better control the narrative of what they displayed. The BWMC and
IWM preferred this over retroactively providing information about the conflict and including
materials to enrich the public’s understanding of Britain’s role in WWI. These spaces would
serve as a memorial to a conflict which they were sure would never be repeated. Considering the
BWMC’s dissolution by the end of 1918 and the beginning of WWII a mere two decades later,
these ideas are rather shortsighted. They highlight how both the BWMC and IWM never strayed
far from the ideals and techniques of propaganda, rather than branching out to the somber,
contemplative business of memorialization which they claimed to undertake.
The BWMC was formed in February 1918 when the Department of Information at
Wellington House became the Ministry of Information, with Lord Beaverbrook as its Minister.
Beaverbrook was also a member of the Committee, along with Lord Rothermere, the chair of the
BWMC, and Alfred Yockney, former editor of the Art Journal. Beaverbrook was additionally the
head of a Canadian scheme to commission modern art during the First World War and believed
Britain could benefit from a similar project. His aim was to drive the British government away
from propaganda which had short-term value during the conflict towards memorialization, which
would have a more lasting national value. The intent of the BWMC was thus “to assemble a
significant contemporary collection representative of the greatest artistic expression of the day”
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(Malvern 69). This significantly ambitious project entailed the commission of seventeen history
paintings by artists including Wyndham Lewis, Paul Nash, and John Singer Sargent, two
sculptural reliefs by C.S. Jagger and Gilbert Ledward, and the commission of thirty-one more
artists. These thirty-one artists were either commissioned to make a single work or employed
full-time for up to ten months, by the end of which the BWMC would receive their total output
(Malvern 69). The BWMC prided itself on being a select and exclusive organization whose
commissioned works would have the weight and authority to satisfy any expert, while also
positioning themselves as forward thinkers by including modern artists whose works would defy
traditional conventions.
Despite the inclusion of modern artwork in the BWMC scheme, this did not entail a
democratizing approach to memorialization. The committee looked to memorialize the First
World War in a way which linked the modern era to the Classical and Renaissance eras. In this
way, the BWMC’s commissioned artwork would express national sacrifice and patriotic ideals
through the high art tradition discussed previously (Walton 396). Their attempts to strive for a
Classical ideal can be further seen in two major elements. One, introduced in an April 1918
Committee meeting, was the adoption of six by ten feet as the standard size for the smaller
commissioned paintings, the same as Uccello’s The Battle of San Romano (fig. 13), which hung
in the National Gallery. Similarities between the modern and Renaissance eras were thus
reinforced as Paolo Uccello was a Florentine painter active during the Early Renaissance.
The other elements were the committee members themselves, who saw their roles as
equivalent to great Renaissance patrons, explaining choices such as the adoption of
Uccello-sized measurements. The size of their great scheme as well as their sense of noble
patriotic duty further encouraged them to make this analogy (Walton 396). After all, not only did
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the BWMC commission what they perceived as groundbreaking art, but they commissioned a
large number of works and had a nascent plan to develop a building in which to house them.
Although the BWMC’s stated goal was to memorialize the First World War through
commissioned artworks, it is clear that the committee’s personal goals played a factor as well.
Rather than considering what the public would need from a WWI art museum, or even if the
public found it necessary, the BWMC sought instead to perpetuate their own legacy.
With the artwork scheme properly addressed, the BWMC turned their attention to a
proposed Memorial Gallery. This building was proposed by two Committee members, the artist
Muirhead Bone and art advisor Robbie Ross. In an earlier letter to the Committee, Ross
explained his ideas for future treatment of the commissioned paintings. He spoke of an
integration between art and architecture within a designated gallery space. The proposal made by
Bone and Ross included building concepts that were heavily influenced by Classical design. In
particular, their concept was influenced by the ways Venetians had housed the works of
Renaissance masters (Walton 398). Thus, the concept for the Memorial Gallery was influenced
by the same Renaissance ideals that the committee members strove towards. Although the
BWMC and their Memorial Gallery plans were both created with the aim of memorialization,
their idealization of Renaissance collection practices corrupted this aim. The Gallery would be
created by people who saw themselves as connoisseurs of high art, rather than seeking to inform
and console the public through artistic offerings. The building plans were thus influenced by
Classical design, revealing a building designed for the elite of society rather than the wider
public who were equally affected by the events of WWI.
The next order of business for the BWMC was to find an architect who would design the
layout of their imagined Memorial Gallery. Above all, the committee sought the talents of
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Charles Holden. Holden was a prominent British architect at the time, known for his modernist
designs and tendency to include sculpture within architectural elements. However, at this point in
time, Holden was serving as a lieutenant with the Directorate of Graves Registration and
Enquiries (DGR&E) in France, in order to mark and register the graves of fallen soldiers. He had
left his architectural firm for a decade in order to first join the DGR&E and later become a
Principal Architect with the Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC) (Karol 18). Holden had
little time for other concerns and thus his relationship with the BWMC was very much
short-lived. They kept a brief correspondence, which culminated in Holden providing a single
sketch of his design for the imagined Memorial Gallery. Although it is difficult to imagine what
could have been from a single drawing, Holden’s cemetery designs as well as his post-war
architectural designs give a further idea of what the Gallery may have looked like. It was
common for him to use clean, simple mass forms and a modernist style, and this may have
translated to the Memorial Gallery, if it were actually constructed (Walton 399). This
architectural style would have been in line with the BWMC’s insistence that their Gallery recall
the great effort of Renaissance patrons, in their commission of unprecedented art and design.
The BWMC did not have long to worry about the designs for their Gallery, as the
committee was plagued with difficulties for much of 1918. British officials began to question the
true purpose of the BWMC as money was scarce and they sought to finance only those projects
they considered essential. Thus, the committee further debated their purpose, claiming that
“pictures would be painted with a definitive propaganda motive” and subsequently changed their
name to the Pictorial Propaganda Committee (PPC) in the summer of 1918. Official questioning
of the BWMC’s purpose as well as its name change supports the idea that memorialization was
never a key motive of the group. Furthermore, as the war ended in November 1918, the Ministry
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of Information was dissolved and funds became incredibly scarce. The PPC hoped the Treasury
would follow through on their previous promise of funds, which ultimately fell through as the
Secretary decided that “the question of renewal...would be considered by the Imperial War
Museum” (Walton 401). With the inclusion of the Imperial War Museum in making monetary
decisions, the PPC never received their promised funds. The closure of the Ministry and the lack
of funds to produce a building in which to house their commissions, the PPC was forced to
dissolve (Walton 401). Its prized art commissions, which totaled thirty-two paintings at the end,
were all acquired by the Imperial War Museum by the end of 1918 and are still held within the
Museum’s art collection today.
At the start of the war, the only extant institution which concerned itself with collecting
and preserving artifacts, records, and trophies from wars in which British forces were involved
was the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Interestingly, the RUSI made no effort to make a
record of the First World War (Kavanagh 80). This lack of foresight partly inspired the formation
of the Imperial War Museum, which was an independently proposed endeavor. The idea for such
a museum was put forth by Charles Ffoulkes, Curator of the Tower Armories in London, and Ian
Malcolm, MP. There was initial pushback from political circles, who accused Ffoulkes and
Malcolm of seeking to bolster and maintain the war mood, rather than seeing a need to record
and remember the conflict. A letter written in May 6, 1917, by the Admiralty’s representative for
the new museum committee, Commander Walcott, stated two reasons for the procurement of
relics while the war was still on, and thus justifying the need for a national war museum. His
argument was founded on the statements that 1) relics, exhibits, etc., were being overlooked and,
in some cases, lost to history due to lack of preservation and 2) some relics were being stolen,
bought, or taken by individual units and persons, with some being sent to the United States
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(Kavanagh 80). After deliberations, Sir Alfred Mond, MP, was sought out by Lord Harcourt to
lead the museum initiative, as Mond was the First Commissioner of Works, and therefore his
successor. As an individual with high power and position, he was in the ideal position to move
this idea further. By March 26, 1917, The Times reported on the initiative to begin a national war
museum and listed appointed committee members as well as the IWM sub-committees:
Admiralty, Air Services, Dominions, Library, Munitions, War Office, and Women’s Work.
Similarly to the BWMC, the initial war museum committee was composed of many
powerful men who had both influence and strong Victorian ideals. The British government’s
early trepidation over whether the committee was simply looking to capitalize on the ‘war mood’
was proven right. This can be seen in how Sir Martin Conway, the Director General of the
committee, explained the war museum’s plans to become a place of reverence and nostalgia for
all involved in the conflict: “when they visit the museum in years to come, they should be able
by its aid to revive the memory of their work for the war, and, pointing to some exhibit, to say
'This thing I did’” (Kavanagh 84). Thus, Conway sought to take advantage of the ‘war mood’ in
hopes that acknowledgment of public war effort would encourage individuals to donate personal
effects to the war museum collection. Without individual contribution to the collection, the
museum would serve little purpose other than as a repository for items used during the First
World War. Instead of being seen as the pitfall it was, this reasoning was used to appeal to the
mass public, reflecting on them rather than on committee planning.
Years later, Conway admitted to the disappointing amount of responses their call for
material received (Kavanagh 84). This lack of engagement gives insight into public sentiments
regarding the construction of a national war museum. Absence of materials could point to an
overall interest in such a museum, but reluctance to part with personal effects, especially if they
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were connected to deceased loved ones. Alternatively, lack of materials could represent total
disregard for such a museum and the refusal to engage with its construction by any means
necessary. Considering early lack of records pertaining to public sentiments towards British
propaganda, it follows that public sentiment towards the museum can only be discerned by
numbers recorded rather than an in-depth analysis of public opinion. Regardless of what public
sentiment lay behind the choice to not engage with the war museum committee, it is evident the
museum expected the public to be proud of their achievements during WWI and willing to have
their efforts memorialized for all to see. Rather than providing a place in which those involved in
the war could reflect and grieve, Conway saw the nascent war museum as a place where soldiers
and nurses, among others, could relive the glory days of fighting for the Empire and share these
experiences with friends and family. Thus, the committee saw their war museum as a
continuation of the propaganda that proliferated during the war rather than a more mature,
retroactive look of the myriad legacies and effects the war had on many.
Indeed their focus on Britain as an Empire rather than a collective of individuals is most
prominent in the name selection of the museum. While it had started out as the National War
Museum, the Dominions Sub-Committee, which was responsible for securing artifacts from the
British colonies’ war efforts, pushed for the name to be changed to the Imperial War Museum
(Kavanagh 88). Thus, an effort to extol the virtues of the British Empire permeated each element
of the museum’s ongoings. This was especially seen in the kinds of art acquired by the IWM.
Much like the BWMC, the IWM had commissioned their own collection of paintings and
drawings. However, these artworks were quite different in purpose, as they emphasized “factual
and correct” depictions of the First World War (Malvern 188). In the words of Malvern,”these
pictures were less ethnographic artefact and more part of the museum’s system of labeling”
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(188). Thus, these artworks were not meant as a single artist’s subjective viewpoint of events, but
as a scientific, objective depiction for the public to accept as fact. Whether the public thought of
these images as the committee meant them to or not is difficult to discern. The IWM had a
second collection that they obtained from the BWMC, which was much more substantial than the
artistic collection amassed by the IWM. The committee’s ideas of what the BWMC’s art
collection stood for was much similar to the BWMC themselves. The modern art included within
the collection represented Britain as following their national destiny to become a leader in
cultural representation (Malvern 189). The inclusion of these works in the IWM’s collection had
a ‘civilizing’ effect on them. Those who could represent their experiences in a culturally
acceptable way were worthy of attention and celebration, and their status within the BWMC and
IWM helped this genre of artwork to become more publicly accepted.
Through their museum displays, the IWM further participated in the “sanctification of
objects” by presenting them as impartial representations of history rather than pieces of other’s
lived experiences. Although the IWM collection moved to many different locations before
acquiring its own building in 1936, its display conventions remained similar throughout the
interwar period. The center of each display area was packed with large exhibits, including
massive weapons of war (fig. 14), and smaller items were placed along the walls, mostly behind
glass (Cornish 44). The IWM placed importance on the ability of the objects to portray war
experiences, without much thought to exhibition design besides placing larger objects in the
middle of the room. Yet, the layout of the exhibition fits within the dichotomy of ‘knowledge
understood’ vs. ‘knowledge proposition’. The IWM’s interwar exhibitions fall into the
‘knowledge understood’ category due to its display conventions. ‘Knowledge understood’
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exhibitions are characterized by a strong axial structure, shallow depth, and a “low-ring factor of
present knowledge” (Pearce 139). The latter means that the exhibition produces a
straight-forward presentation of knowledge, where the relationship between each object to
another and to the exhibition as a whole is thoroughly understood and leaves little room for
interpretation. This is in contrast to ‘knowledge proposition’ exhibitions where the display
elements are less structured. They allow for a higher ‘ring-factor’, thus presenting knowledge as
a proposition, which may encourage visitors to question objects further or transfer personal
meaning onto them (Pearce 139). By examining the ramifications of the IWM’s display methods,
it is evident that the displays were meant to provide objective truth to visitors. Furthermore, this
occurred without any acknowledgement that their objective truth stemmed from the subjective
input of IWM staff.
During the war, the Tate Gallery went through modifications of its own, including the
acquisition of a Board of Trustees and a more detailed brief that described the museum’s role in
representing modern British art and modern foreign art. The Tate also served as a kind of
repository, as it was assumed that pieces in the collection would later earn the title of
‘masterpiece’ and be promoted to such museums as the National Gallery. In 1920, just after
WWI, the IWM loaned forty-eight pieces, mainly from their recently acquired BWMC art
collection, to the Tate Gallery for a number of years (Malvern 189). Those pieces loaned to the
Tate were those completed by younger, more modern artists, such as Nevinson, Paul Nash, and
Wyndham Lewis. By contrast, the IWM retained and displayed artworks by academic artists
such as Sargent and William Orpen.
These artworks were often displayed in the IWM separately from the weapons and other
artifacts, as they were understood to be separate entities. Unlike these artifacts and the artwork
Popovic 40
commissioned by the IWM themselves, the BWMC paintings undeniably had their own
individual, subjective meanings. This meant that these artworks were marketed as the
“humanistic face of the museum’s destructive and deadly exhibits'' (Malvern 190). In comparing
these images of the IWM’s Art Section (fig. 15, fig. 16) to the previous image of the IWM’s
main exhibit, many differences come to light. The Art Section provides subjective viewpoints of
the First World War without much effort to mask the subjectivity of the images. These paintings
and drawings are acknowledged as the product of one person, even as they are used to describe
the scope of experience during WWI. By comparison, the main exhibits within the IWM display
objects such as tanks, guns, and other weapons in a manner similar to a parade. The identity of
who created and used such devices is masked in favor of belonging instead to a military
designation such as Admiralty, Army, etc. The dichotomy between these sections of the IWM
provide contradicting messages about the legacy of WWI, even though they hoped to instill
national pride within the visitors who came to the museum. Not only did the IWM continue to
provide a view of WWI similar to propaganda, but they presented acquired artworks as sources
of national pride rather than a starting point for poignant contemplation of WWI’s effects.
Both the BWMC and IWM were instrumental institutions in setting the tone for official
memorialization of the First World War. Even before the war’s end, both were created with the
purpose of considering Britain’s legacy within the conflict, and ensuring that purpose was carried
out effectively. The BWMC fell short of this goal, as political strife and meager allowances
meant that they were able to secure a large number of artworks without procuring a building in
which to display them. These artworks were commissioned, not as a genuine effort to support the
work of younger, emerging artists but rather to obtain fine art with which the BWMC could
control the narrative about WWI memorialization. This as well as changing their name to the
Popovic 41
PPC belie a tendency towards propaganda strategies that did not dissipate as the war came to an
end. The IWM thus inherited the BWMC’s collection as they themselves were in the midst of
obtaining their own artifacts and securing a place for display. The IWM’s spaces were meant to
serve as a memorial to a conflict whose scale they were sure would remain unprecedented. With
the occurrence of WWII a mere two decades later, they would later shift the purpose of their
museum from memorializing WWI to becoming a focal point of knowledge about Britain’s
involvement in various conflicts. Thus, the IWM’s original goal of becoming a memorial to the
First World War is disingenuous, as the museum did not reconsider the ways in which they
collected and displayed objects to better fit this category, but rather moved on and continued to
venerate the actions of British forces.
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Conclusion
In the midst of the First World War, the British Establishment turned their concerns away
from the production of propaganda and towards the more lasting work of memorialization. This
shifting of priority is exemplified by the creation of the British War Memorials Committee
(BWMC) and the Imperial War Museum (IWM) in the last two years of the war. Of great
importance was the question of how Britain’s role in WWI would be remembered. Many
organizations, including the BWMC and IWM, sought to answer this question by collecting their
own groups of WWI-related objects and procuring a place in which to display them. However,
their acts of memorialization took more from past propagandistic creations than attempting to
create an original look into a then-unprecedented conflict. The internal focus of these groups
encouraged propagandistic views as they reverted to the practices they knew best. The supposed
idealistic efforts of remembering such a conflict was thus corrupted by individual goals and an
unwillingness to see the British forces as anything but superior and ground-breaking in its
efforts.
Throughout the First World War, there were myriad artistic mediums which those both
military and nonmilitary used to document the conflict. Noted as one of the premier fine arts,
painting had to compete with other mediums, such as photography and film, on a large scale. The
latter two mediums appealed to a mass population, as newspapers were circulated daily and
theaters were easily accessible. In contrast, paintings were housed in museums and galleries,
where visitors were meant to feel the awe and power of artworks. As well as their location, the
question of censorship was frequent throughout WWI, as photographs and films needed to be
reviewed and edited before being disseminated among the public. Photography was seen as a
‘witnessing’ medium and the government sought to prevent the public from witnessing certain
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events, primarily those that put the British forces in a negative light. Painting was alternatively
seen as an ‘experiencing’ medium, and while not immune to censorship, its subjectivity was
more representative of the artists themselves rather than the British forces. This explains the
collection of paintings by the BWMC and IWM, since the medium was considered fine art and
provided unique depictions of the conflict.
Propaganda during the First World War utilized these artistic mediums to the British
government’s advantage. Their adage “it is better to influence those who can influence others
than attempt a direct appeal to the mass population” properly summarizes British propaganda
efforts from 1914-16. These efforts were focused on countries abroad, but this sentiment would
prove true for the BWMC and IWM years later. As part of these efforts, the Foreign Office in
London sought out venerated professionals when sending their materials to both neutral and
enemy countries, in the hopes that the public would trust them more readily than the British
government (Sanders 101). Propaganda strategies would shift at the beginning of 1917 to more
internal matters, as morale lessened due to major Allied losses. The first coordinated home front
propaganda effort, the National War Aims Committee (NWAC) was created in order to maintain
ideals of Liberty and Justice in the face of the enemy and quell any pacifist sentiment.
Propaganda thus became more simplified, as images and information were increasingly censored
in order to keep the public in the dark and raise morale. This strategy was also adopted by the
BWMC and IWM, as they procured objects and determined what was valuable for the public to
know about them.
The BWMC and IWM were formed as Britain developed internal propaganda strategies
for 1917-18. As part of the newly formed Ministry of Information (MoI), the BWMC was
established in February 1918. The IWM was formed a year earlier, in March 1917, and was
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actively acquiring objects for its collection when the BWMC was formed. The BWMC
committee saw themselves as equivalent to Renaissance patrons from centuries before. They
further established this status through an ambitious war art scheme and arranging plans to build a
Hall of Remembrance to house them in. By the aforementioned propaganda techniques, the MoI
began to question the integrity of the BWMC’s proclaimed mission and as a result, the BWMC
was forced to change its name to the Pictorial Propaganda Committee (PPC). As the conflict
came to an end, however, alternative schemes proved to be more productive due to the attention
and finances allowed them. The BWMC’s main source of finance, the MoI, disbanded at the end
of the war, and they were not deemed eligible for the meager allowances that remained. As a
result, the BWMC folded, and the resulting paintings from their war art scheme were transferred
to the IWM.
Along with amassing their own collection of WWI relics, the IWM had their own
artworks which they commissioned during the conflict, to which the BWMC collection was
added. The museum, like the BWMC, had critics who correctly assumed that the IWM was
looking to take advantage of the ‘war mood’ to construct a glorified shrine to the First World
War. Allowing the Tate Gallery to borrow many of their modernist artworks for extended periods
and creating modes of display which prized war weapons and other such relics are clear
examples of this attitude. Instead of providing a place of remembrance to allow visitors to reflect
on their subjective experience of the war, the museum established WWI as a national triumph,
effectively designating their views as an objective fact.
The IWM’s ongoing legacy has been felt over the past century and continues to this day.
During the interwar period, there were rare instances where paintings were hung alongside guns
in the IWM’s exhibition space. This effectively removed the aura that was manufactured by the
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paintings’ isolation and instead created an interesting dichotomy by heightening the brutality of
the weapons while also providing additional social context for the paintings (Malvern 194). After
WWII, paintings commissioned during that conflict were hung with artworks from WWI, which
provided another case of subjective exhibition display. In this way, visitors could attribute their
own meaning to their placement, rather than observing a single piece with established meaning.
Official war painting during WWII lacked the grandiosity of the previous war, perhaps due to the
knowledge that the second conflict which seemed so unthinkable became a reality two decades
later (Malvern 195). Sue Malvern proposes that these display strategies offered “disconcerting,
heterodox and discontinuous sights”, but I propose that they in fact were the most
forward-thinking endeavors that the IWM has undertaken (197). This lack of overarching
national pride could explain the lack of restraint when it came to placing objects of differing
mediums and time periods together. If awe and interest could not be inspired by the pieces
themselves, perhaps a new display strategy would achieve the same effect. These choices painted
the IWM in a more visitor-friendly light rather than as an institutional authority. However, these
efforts were few and far between and would not last for long.
In the 1980s, four decades after the end of WWII, the IWM was redesigned as part of two
major factors affecting museums at the time. First, Britain was in the middle of the ‘second
Museum age’, where the government sought to donate funds to these institutions to lessen their
reliance on public funds to sustain themselves. Second, after a long period of rejection, there was
newfound support for creating memorials, especially those focused on the Holocaust. This
support had been met with equal apprehension as the “forms and meanings of commemoration”
could take on lives of their own and there was loss of faith in existing war memorials to serve a
similar purpose (Malvern 197). As a conflict-focused museum with a large component of WWI
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artifacts, it is important to ask whether the IWM could ever be considered a memorial. This
question could be answered in the negative since it is fundamentally a museum that houses
collections and conducts its own exhibits. The sheer fact that the IWM’s collections include war
artifacts does not automatically make it a memorial as the importance lies in the collection’s
context. As museums house collections as a testament to the culture of varied societies, the IWM
serves to uplift narratives of war and destruction rather than discussing the lessons to be learned
from such violent episodes.
Not only does the IWM not support memorialization, it actively recalls the glory days of
the British Empire through nothing less than its name. As mentioned previously, the museum
was called the National War Museum when it was first formed in 1917. However, as time went
on and a proper committee was formed, the head of the Dominions section rallied for the name to
be changed to the Imperial War Museum (Kavanagh 88). It is fitting that those in charge of
securing WWI artifacts from countries colonized by Britain would support this name change, but
what is unusual is that the name has never been altered for 103 years. If the museum had
changed its focus to report on the effects that British imperialism has had on these formerly
colonized nations, perhaps the name would be justified. However, the museum’s goals remain
largely similar to those proposed almost a century ago: to inform the public of the conflicts in
which Britain has fought and to use this history as a source of pride. Thus, for as long as this
museum is known as the IWM, its national pride will be synonymous with its imperialistic past.
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